Working Paper: The effect of restrictive policy instruments on Belgian fishing fleet dynamics by Stouten, H. et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FACULTEIT ECONOMIE 
EN BEDRIJFSKUNDE 
 
 
TWEEKERKENSTRAAT 2 
B-9000 GENT 
Tel. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.34.61 
Fax. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.35.92 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER 
 
 
The effect of restrictive policy instruments on Belgian 
fishing fleet dynamics1 
 
Hendrik STOUTEN2 
Aime HEENE3 
Xavier GELLYNCK4 
Hans POLET5 
 
November 2008 
 
2008/540 
 
                                                          
1 Published in Aquatic Living Resources, volume 21, 247-258. 
2 Corresponding author, Institute for Agriculture and Fisheries Research (ILVO)/Faculty of Economics and 
Business Administration, Ghent University. Ankerstraat 1, 8400 Ostend, Belgium 
3 Department Management and Organization, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent 
University, Tweekerkentstraat 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium 
4 Department of Agricultural Economics, Faculty of Bio-Science Engineering, Ghent University, Coupure Links 
653, 9000 Ghent, Belgium  
5 Institute for Agriculture and Fisheries Research (ILVO) Ankerstraat 1, 8400 Ostend, Belgium 
     D/2008/7012/49 
The effect of restrictive policy instruments on Belgian fishing fleet 
dynamics. 
 
Hendrik Stoutena, Aimé Heeneb, Xavier Gellynckc, Hans Poletd 
 
a Institute for Agriculture and Fisheries Research (ILVO)/Faculty of Economics and Business 
Administration, Ghent University 
Ankerstraat 1, B-8400 Ostend, Belgium 
Phone: (0032) 479 20 23 26 
Hendrik.Stouten@ilvo.vlaanderen.be 
 
b Professor, Department Management and Organization, Faculty of Economics and Business 
Administration, Ghent University 
Tweekerkentstraat 2, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium 
Phone: (0032) 475 48 24 26 
Aime.Heene@UGent.be 
 
c Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Faculty of Bio-Science Engineering, Ghent 
University 
Coupure Links 653, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium 
Phone: (0032) 9 264 59 23 
 Xavier.Gellynck@UGent.be 
 
d Institute for Agriculture and Fisheries Research (ILVO) 
Ankerstraat 1, B-8400 Ostend, Belgium 
Phone: (0032) 59 34 22 50 
Hans.Polet@ilvo.vlaanderen.be 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Even with the rapid changes in the level of complexity and the uncertainty of the environment 
in which Belgian sea fisheries operate, fisheries management in Belgium is still mainly based 
on restrictive policy instruments founded in the biological approach of fisheries management 
science. Since they will continue to play an important role, this paper evaluated changes in 
three restrictive policy instruments and their effect on future fleet performance and dynamics, 
i.e. maximum fishing days, total quota-restrictions and licences. 
 
These effects are tested through scenarios in a microeconomic simulation model, including 
sensitivity analysis. This study opts for a dynamic simulation model based on a microeconomic 
approach of fleet dynamics using system dynamics as a modelling technique (operational base: 
Vensim®DSS). 
 
The results indicated that changes in maximum fishing days and total quota resulted in higher 
fluctuations in fleet performance and dynamics compared to changes in licences. Furthermore, 
changes in maximum fishing days and total quota had a direct impact on fleet performance, 
though not always as expected, whereas licences only affected fleet performance indirectly 
since they only limit the entry of new vessels to the fleet and they can block the growth of 
successful sub fleets. 
 
 2
The outcomes of this study are translated into practical recommendations for improving 
fisheries management. Firstly, policy makers need to be more aware of misperceptions of 
feedback. Secondly, the results proved that altering only one type of restrictive policy 
instrument at a time often fails to meet desired outcomes. Therefore, policy makers need to find 
a balance in combining policy instruments. Finally, this paper opens the discussion on the 
future value of restrictive policy instruments in the rapidly changing, complex and uncertain 
fisheries environment. It suggests rethinking their use from “preserving a status quo and social 
peace” toward a driving factor in “stimulating fleet dynamics.” 
 
 
KEY WORDS: Fisheries management, restrictive policy instruments, sensitivity simulation, 
system dynamics, fleet performance, fleet dynamics. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Even with the rapid changes in the level of complexity (Healey and Hennessey 1998; Lane and 
Stephenson 1999) and the uncertainty (Charles 1998; Cochrane 1999) of the environment in 
which Belgian sea fisheries operate, fisheries management in Belgium is still mainly based on 
restrictive policy instruments (often imposed by the European Union) founded in the biological 
approach of fisheries management science. Since they will continue to play an important role, 
this study examines their potential future effects on Belgian fleet performance and dynamics. 
Three restrictive policy instruments are under research: (i) total quota restrictions, (ii) the effort 
restriction of maximum days at sea, and (iii) the limited entry program of fishing licenses. 
 
Their future effects are analysed through scenarios in a dynamic simulation model based on a 
microeconomic approach of fleet dynamics and sensitivity analysis. The Belgian sub fleets are 
the key agents in the model and their gross operating profit and fleet size are the key variables 
of interest. As a result, the model takes the perspective of sub fleets. The model consists of four 
homogeneous sub fleets, three fishing grounds, one theoretical average species and three 
restrictive policy instruments. The value of this research is threefold. First, it makes policy 
makers aware of potential future effects restrictive policy instruments can have on fleet 
performance and dynamics. Second, it gives practical suggestions for the future use of these 
restrictive policy instruments and for improving fisheries management. Finally, it starts the 
discussion of the future role restrictive policy instruments can have in managing fleet 
performance and dynamics. 
 
The paper contains four sections. Section one on materials and methods describes the 
simulation model consisting of the main interaction between the Belgian fleet and the 
restrictive policy instruments. Section two contains the results which clearly indicate 
differences in the impact of restrictive policy instruments on future fleet performance and 
dynamics. Section three discusses the results, gives practical suggestions for improving 
fisheries management, and discusses the future role of restrictive policy instruments, and 
finally, conclusions are drawn. 
 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
The study uses the Belgian fleet as a case study. This fleet consists of four important sub fleets: 
(i) the shrimp trawler fleet: beam trawlers targeting shrimps (13 percent of the total fleet in 
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2005), (ii) the fleet of eurocutters: beam trawlers with an engine power between 200kW and 
221kW not targeting shrimps (30 percent of the total fleet in 2005), (iii) the large beam trawler 
fleet: beam trawlers with an engine power higher than 662 kW not targeting shrimps (44 
percent of the total fleet in 2005), and (iv) the set netter fleet: vessels using set nets as their 
main fishing method (3 percent of the total fleet in 2005). 
 
The Belgian total fleet declined dramatically between 1950 and 2005 from 457 to 119 vessels, 
but the average gross tonnage and engine power for an average vessel has multiplied, resulting 
in a small but quite powerful fleet (table 1). This behaviour is mainly due to a dragging 
“profitability crisis” caused by increasing operational costs and decreasing catches. As a result, 
many vessels have exited the fleet or were reengineered toward more powerful vessels. 
Nevertheless, gross operating profits remained low (figure 1) leading to small margins to pay 
off debts. Table 2 illustrates these low gross operating profits for an average vessel of the sub 
fleets in 2005. However, it also indicates a huge variability between and within sub fleets. 
Consequently, not every vessel in the Belgian fleet performed insufficiently, which is seen in 
the dynamics of sub fleets during the last years (figure 2). 
 
[TABLE 1] 
 
[FIG 1] 
 
[TABLE 2] 
 
[FIG 2] 
 
To evaluate the future performance and dynamics of the Belgian fleet under restrictive policy 
instruments, scenarios in a simulation model will be used (time horizon of 18 years with a time 
step (∆t) of a week). This study opts for a dynamic simulation model using system dynamics as 
a modelling technique (operational base: Vensim®DSS) (Moxnes 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2003; 
Dudley 2003, 2003; Stouten et al. 2007). The model is based on insights gained from the 
literature and from expert group meetings involving fisheries scientists. Additionally, informal 
contacts with the fishing industry and policy makers have further improved our global 
understanding of fisheries management. Based on these insights, decisions were made 
concerning the conceptualisation and scope of the simulation model.  
 
This study applies a microeconomic approach to fleet dynamics in which restrictive policy 
instruments (i.e. maximum fishing days, total quota size and licences) affect tactical and 
investment decisions of sub fleets (Mathiesen 2003), resulting in changes in fleet performance 
and dynamics. Consequently, sub fleets are the key agents in the model and gross operating 
profit (measured in gross operation profit for an average vessel) and fleet size (measured in 
number of vessels) of the total fleet are the key variables of interest. As a result, the model 
takes the perspective of sub fleets and unveils their reinforcing investment loop mainly 
balanced by the three restrictive policies under research (figure 3). 
 
[FIGURE 3] 
 
The interactions between these loops cause dynamic complexity (Senge 1990). Gaining insights 
in how these loops affect the performance and dynamics of sub fleets when restrictive policy 
instruments are altered is vital in meeting this paper’s objective. Therefore, a comprehensible 
model is chosen above a comprehensive model since detailed complexity (Senge 1990) can 
 4
blur or block our understanding of dynamic complexity. In line with this principle, four 
important decisions are made. First, the model does not include a biological component, 
meaning that stock dynamics are outside the scope of the model. Therefore, this model is no 
standard bio-economic model. As a result, total quota and catchability are not influenced by 
biological variables. Second, the agents in the model are “homo economicus.” This can be 
justified since many models concerning fisheries management also use this “homo 
economicus” principle (Opaluch and Bockstael 1984). Third, profit generated by the sub fleets 
can only be invested in a new vessel and there is no external investment in the fleet. Finally, the 
size of the arrays in the model needed to be brief and meaningful (table 3). 
 
[TABLE 3] 
 
Next, the main economic rules of the model need to be explained. Figure 3 indicates that the 
model contains two important decision rules: a fishing tactical decision rule and an investment 
decision rule. The fishing tactical decision rule addresses the sub fleets’ choice on where to 
fish. It sends the sub fleet to the fishing ground with the highest catch per unit of effort if 
fishing is still possible. 
 
 is defined as a boolean variable that takes the value one on time t if for sub fleet s: (i) 
fishing is still an option (see further for explanation) on fishing ground g and (ii) fishing ground 
g is the fishing ground where sub fleet s can catch the most fish per unit of effort.  is zero 
for all other situations. 
 
Let  be the fish price on time t which is given,  the number of fishing days 
left on time t for sub fleet s,  the amount of total quota left for fishing ground g and  
the catch rate for a given (s,g) on time t. The model selects  as the maximal catch rate on 
time t for (S,G). 
 
  (1) 
 
In equation (1), the number of fishing days left on time t for sub fleet s is (with ∆T=52∆t or one 
year): 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
Where  is the initial number of fishing days for sub fleet s,  is the number of days 
at sea in a week (in a ∆t) for sub fleet s, and  is the number of vessels for sub fleet s 
on time t. 
 
In equation (1), the amount of total quota left for fishing ground g is given by (with ∆T=52∆t or 
one year): 
 
 
 
(3)
 
Where  is the initial amount of quota for fishing ground g. 
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The fishing tactical decision rule (equation (1)) determines  which is the average gross 
operating profit for an average vessel for sub fleet s on time t. 
 
 
 
(4) 
 
Where  is revenue for sub fleet s on time t and  is operational cost for sub fleet s on 
time t. 
 
The revenue for a sub fleet s on time t is: 
 
 
 
(5) 
 
In equation (4) the operational cost for sub fleet s on time t is: 
 
 
 
(6) 
 
Where  is the variable cost for sub fleet s for fishing ground g on time t and is given. 
The travelling cost   is not given and can be calculated from:  
 
  (7) 
 
Where  is the distance to the fishing ground g,  is the given fuel consumption per 
kilometer for an average vessel of sub fleet s and  is the fuel price for a litre fuel on 
time t. 
 
Additionally, the fishing tactical decision rule influences the investment decision rule through 
influencing the financial power of a sub fleet. The financial power of a sub fleet s on time t is 
measured in savings of a sub fleet s on time t. 
 
  (8) 
 
Where  is the savings of a sub fleet s on time t,  is earnings for sub fleet s,  is 
the financial result of the investment decision for sub fleet s on time t. 
 
In equation (8) earnings for sub fleet s on time t are: 
 
  (9) 
 
Where  is fixed costs for sub fleet s on time t and  is the relay of debt for sub 
fleet s on time t which is a fixed fraction of the total debts of sub fleet s on time t. 
 
In equation (8),  depends on the outcome of the investment decision on time t. The 
investment decision contains three options: (i) investment in a new vessel, (ii) demolition of a 
vessel, and (iii) neither.  is the boolean variable that takes the value one on time t if for 
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sub fleet s: (i) the number of licences left is strictly positive, (ii) the sum of money from the 
savings and the possible bank loan does not exceed a threshold value, and (iii) the remaining 
debts are not exceeding a threshold value.  is zero for all other situations. 
 
Let  be the number of licences left for the total fleet on time t,  is the possible bank 
loan for sub fleet s on time t,  is the amount of debts for sub fleet s on time t,  the 
threshold value for  and  the threshold value for . 
 
  (10) 
 
 is then the boolean variable that takes the value one on time t if for sub fleet s: (i) the 
sum of money from the savings and the possible bank loan is negative and (ii) the number of 
vessels is strictly positive.  is zero for all other situations. 
 
  (11) 
 
In equation (8),  for sub fleet s on time t can now be written as: 
 
  (12) 
 
Where  is the price of a new vessel for sub fleet s on time t and  is the 
money sub fleet s gets from the demolition of a vessel which is a demolition price, theoretically 
speaking. 
 
The number of vessels in sub fleet s on time t is then given by: 
 
  (13) 
 
The scenarios (table 4) used to test the effect of restrictive policy instruments on the 
performance and dynamics of the Belgian fleet are based either on univariate or multivariate 
sensitivity simulations (Monte Carlo simulation). Each scenario has a time horizon of 18 years 
(936 weeks, from January 1, 1997, till December 31, 2014) with a time step (∆t) of a week. The 
first nine years show the fit between the simulated data and the historical data (reference 
mode). From 2005 on, the simulated data from the scenarios gives insights to the future 
behaviour of the fleet performance and dynamics till the year 2015. 
 
[TABLE 4] 
 
To run the simulation model with its sensitivity simulations, data was collected from individual 
vessels on catch composition, effort allocation and financial situation for the years 1997 
through 2005 (see appendix). These data were compiled from two institutes. There is a very 
useful database called “Belsamp” hosted at the biological section of the Institute for 
Agriculture and Fisheries Research containing detailed data per individual vessel on catch 
composition and effort allocation. For financial data on an individual vessel level, the Belgian 
Sea Fishery Service of the Flemish government was addressed. They collect financial data for 
the Belgian sea fisheries fleet through a survey (on a voluntary annual basis, sample of 
approximately 50 percent of the fleet (i.e. approximately 65 vessels)). This study uses the data 
between the years 1997 and 2005 as variable input and to form a reference mode for the 
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simulation model. From 2005 onward, all variable input data were kept constant at the 2005 
level. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
In evaluating the explanatory power of a simulation model, the fit between the simulated data 
(baseline) and the historical data (reference mode) needs to be investigated. Since this study 
opts for a comprehensible model above a comprehensive model, the goodness-of-fit-statistics 
are quite poor (e.g. the R-square for average gross operating profit per vessel is 0.36). 
Nevertheless, figure 4 illustrates that the graphs of the simulated data and the reference mode 
for average gross operating profit per vessel have the same basic behaviour, though the 
simulated data is systematically located below the historical data. This systematic fault is 
mainly because not all the Belgian fishing grounds with their total quota are included in the 
model. Additionally, average gross operating profit per vessel is a subtraction of revenues per 
vessel and operational costs per vessel, which are often both large figures in Belgian fisheries. 
Such calculation results in a small outcome easily subject to systematic under- or over-
estimations. 
 
Figure 4 also illustrates the fit between the simulated data and reference mode for “number of 
vessels in the fleet.” Initially, the fit looks good but further inquiry into the individual dynamics 
of the sub fleets indicates a rapid conversion of the fleet which is only partly observed in reality 
(figure 5). This rapid conversion is caused by the systematically underestimation of average 
gross operating profit per vessel by the simulation model. As a result, non-profitable fisheries 
go bankrupt faster and “zero-profit fisheries” (Salz 2006) become non-profitable fisheries 
going bankrupt as well. Consequently, these bankrupt vessels exit the fleet, leaving fewer 
vessels with the residual amount of total quota. These remaining vessels will have a better 
opportunity for increasing their revenues and therefore increase their future investment 
potential. However, this explanation only contains an explanatory power when total quota are 
common pool resources and under the “ceteris paribus” clause. In conclusion, the simulation 
output is plausible taking into account the focus on the comprehensibility of the simulation 
model and the aim of the paper. 
 
[FIG. 4] 
 
[FIG. 5] 
 
Sensitivity simulation on the number of maximum fishing days 
 
The restrictive policy instrument of maximum fishing days influences fleet performance and 
dynamics by affecting the fishing tactics of fishermen (i.e. the boolean variable  for (s,g) in 
equation (1)). Two multivariate sensitivity analyses (each containing 1000 runs) were run to 
unveil the effect of changes of maximum 10 percent in maximum fishing days on fleet 
performance and dynamics (under the “ceteris paribus” clause). The four parameters under 
sensitivity simulation (  for every (s)) were simultaneously and randomly varied between 
their maximum and minimum values (table 4). 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the impact of decreasing the number of maximum fishing days on average 
gross operating profit per vessel and total fleet size. When the mean value of average gross 
operating profit per vessel and total fleet size from the sensitivity simulation are compared with 
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the values from the baseline, some small negative effect on future fleet performance and 
dynamics can be observed. By 2015, average gross operating profit per vessel will be 9.6 
percent lower compared to the baseline. 
 
In contrast, the outer bounds of the 95 percent confidence intervals also indicate the chance of a 
positive impact on average gross operating profit per vessel. This is counterintuitive and can be 
explained when vessels exit the fleet, since a decline in maximum fishing days caused them to 
go bankrupt. Consequently, a smaller fleet is left with the same amount of total quota. Even 
with less fishing days, some sub fleets can succeed in catching more fish because now they 
have the possibility to catch a larger proportion of the total quota. As a result of equation (5), 
more catch leads to more revenues and therefore increases average gross operating profit per 
vessel for these sub fleets (equation (4)). This increase in average gross operating profit per 
vessel can result in a general increase in average gross operating profit for a vessel of the total 
fleet. However, this explanation is only valid when total quota are common pool resources and 
given the “ceteris paribus” clause. 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the impact a decrease in maximum fishing days has on sub fleet dynamics. 
Compared to the baseline, most sub fleets have no immediate dramatic changes in fleet size. 
Only large beam trawlers have a large 95 percent confidence interval. As a result, they are the 
sub fleet whose size is the most sensitive to changes in maximum fishing days. 
 
If the number of maximum fishing days per sub fleet increases, both the average gross 
operating profit per vessel and total Belgian fleet size generated by the sensitivity simulation 
slightly decreases in the long term (approximately -5 percent) (figure 6). Further inquiry on the 
sub fleet level indicates that on average no sub fleet significantly increases due to the additional 
maximum fishing days (figure 7). In contrast, the sub fleet of the large beam trawlers even 
decreases. This counterintuitive behaviour is caused mainly by the fishing tactical decision rule 
(equation (1)). The rule sends the sub fleets to the fishing ground with the highest catch per unit 
of effort, not taking into account the amount of fuel necessary to steam toward this “best” 
fishing ground. With the high fuel prices in the model (and in reality), this behaviour can lead 
to financial losses on trip level resulting in declining average gross operating profit per vessel. 
If sub fleets are given more fishing days, this decision rule sends fishermen to these further 
located fishing grounds more often. Consequently, these extra trips can result in financial losses 
on trip level leading to a decrease in average gross operating profit. Although this decision rule 
is artificial, many fishermen act in similar ways. Giving them extra fishing days will result in 
more time spent at sea without performing a decent cost-benefit analysis. 
 
[FIG. 6] 
 
[FIG. 7] 
 
Sensitivity simulation on the amount of total quota 
 
Total quota regulations restrict the amount of fish the fleet is allowed to land during a certain 
time frame. In Belgium, each fishing ground has its own total quota. Therefore, changing these 
amounts of total quota affects the fishing tactics of fishermen (equation (1)). Two similar 
multivariate sensitivity simulations as for maximum fishing days are performed to analyse the 
effect of changes of maximum 10 percent in the amount of total quota on fleet performance and 
dynamics. These sensitivity simulations have three parameters under sensitivity:  for every 
(g) (table 4). 
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When the amounts of total quota are decreased, the mean value of average gross operating 
profit per vessel from the sensitivity simulation is situated below the baseline until the end of 
2012 (figure 8). This gap was at its maximum in 2007 at 9.2 percent. From 2013 onward, this 
mean value started to exceed the baseline. In 2015, this gap reaches 24 percent. The average 
value for the number of vessels in the fleet shows a similar behaviour. Consequently, 
decreasing the amounts of total quota on fishing grounds can result in a better performing fleet 
in the long run without further harming its size. 
 
This outcome is not expected and therefore counterintuitive. This behaviour is caused mainly 
by two mechanisms. First, large beam trawlers leave the business a bit faster compared to the 
baseline (figure 9) resulting in a smaller fleet which is left earlier with the same amount of total 
quota leading to an increased average gross operating profit per vessel (as earlier explained). 
Second, if total quota on fishing grounds far off shore are lowered, these quota can be exploited 
with less trips, often resulting in financial losses. Subsequently, their negative impact on gross 
operating profit per vessel of the fleet will be more limited (as earlier explained). 
 
The fleet dynamics on sub fleet level is illustrated by figure 9 and indicate on average a faster 
decline in the number of large beam trawlers due to a decrease in total quota. In the long run, 
this decline is beneficial for the number of eurocutters, since both sub fleets compete for quota 
on the same fishing grounds. The other two sub fleets show no immediate major changes in 
fleet size compared to the baseline. 
 
When the amount of total quota increases (maximum 10 percent), the average gross operating 
profit per vessel almost certainly slightly increases (figure 8). This is translated into a slower 
decrease in total fleet size. In the long run, there is even room for a fleet recovery (indicated by 
the upper boundary of the 95 percent confidence interval). This possible fleet recovery is due to 
a slower decline in the number of large beam trawlers (also broad confidence intervals) 
combined with the increase in shrimp trawlers (figure 9). 
 
[FIG. 8] 
 
[FIG. 9] 
 
Sensitivity simulation on the number of licences 
 
This restrictive policy instrument limits the total fleet size by influencing equation (10) of the 
investment decision rule. The effect of changes of maximum 10 percent in the number of 
licenses on fleet performance and dynamics is tested by two univariate sensitivity analyses 
(1000 runs). The parameter under sensitivity is  (table 4). 
 
The effect of decreasing the number of licences on the average gross operating profit per vessel 
is small (on average ± 3 percent deviation compared to the baseline) with exception of 2014 
(deviation of +11.9 percent) (figure 10). The same conclusions can be drawn for the total fleet 
size. However, the small change in total fleet size houses an interesting finding at the sub fleet 
level. The decline in the number of licences delays the growth of the shrimp trawler fleet 
(figure 11). More generally speaking, if a sub fleet is profitable, its fleet size can only grow as 
long as licences are available (equation (10)). As a result, the protective power of licences also 
blocks the growth of successful sub fleets. 
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Average gross operating profit per vessel, the total fleet size and the sub fleet sizes are not 
affected by an increase in the number of licences because it has no direct impact on fleet 
performance given the scope of our model. Consequently, increasing the number of licenses 
when the total fleet size is continuously decreasing has obviously no impact on future fleet 
performance and dynamics.  
 
[FIG. 10] 
 
[FIG. 11] 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This study shows that the effect of restrictive policy instruments on fishing fleet dynamics is 
not uniform. A distinction needs to be made between restrictive policy instruments affecting the 
fishing tactical decisions and those affecting the investment decisions. For the Belgian case, 
changes in maximum fishing days and total quota result in larger changes in fleet performance 
and dynamics compared to changes in licences. Furthermore, changes in the first category have 
a direct impact on fleet performance, though not always as expected. Licences only affect fleet 
performance indirectly since they limit the entry of new vessels to the fleet on the one hand and 
they often block the growth of successful sub fleets on the other.  
 
A constantly returning observation was counterintuitive behaviour of fleet performance and 
dynamics due to certain policy changes. This counterintuitive behaviour is partly caused by 
“misperception of feedback” (Sterman 1989; Diehl and Sterman 1995). “Misperception of 
feedback” is often observed in managing natural resources (Moxnes 1998a, 1998b) and occurs 
when a system is dynamically complex (Senge 1990). In Belgium, as in many other countries, 
the “system” of managing fisheries is dynamically complex because it consists of many 
interactions between reinforcing and balancing feedback loops. Consequently, changing the 
strength of restrictive policy instruments can result in a counterintuitive outcome. 
 
Next, the results must be translated into practical suggestions for policy makers to improve 
fisheries management. Since this study is a basic study and further research on this topic is 
needed for the Belgian case, the practical suggestion will be general guidelines in the usage of 
restrictive policy instruments. Most importantly, policy makers need to be aware of 
misperceptions of feedback when changes are made in restrictive policy instruments. 
Therefore, further research will try to introduce our simulation model in the group of Belgian 
policy makers making them (more) aware of these counterintuitive effects. Second, the results 
show that altering only one type of restrictive policy instrument often will not result in the 
desired output, or will simply be inappropriate (e.g. increasing the number of maximum fishing 
days when total quota are already fully exploited). Therefore, policy makers need to find a 
balance in combining policy instruments. Finally, when increased fleet performance is the aim 
for future fisheries management, the authors’ advice for the short term (and taking into account 
the scope of the model) is to convert the total fleet toward a smaller and more profitable fleet. 
This study proved that the restrictive policy instruments that affect the fishing tactics of 
fishermen are most suitable in meeting this objective. The authors prefer to decrease the 
maximum fishing days for every sub fleet by the same substantial percentage, resulting in 
highly unproductive large beam trawlers exiting the fleet, leaving more room for productive 
vessels to enhance profitability. If necessary, total quotas can be slightly increased to 
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compensate for the loss in fishing days. The highly productive sub fleets will benefit from this 
policy. As a result, the fleet will be profitable, making future investment an option again. 
 
This brings us to the discussion of the future value of restrictive policy instruments. Since 
fisheries management science has broadened its scope from a purely biological (Russell 1931; 
Graham 1935) over a bioeconomic (Gordon 1953, 1954; Scott 1955; Crutchfield 1956, 1959) to 
finally a political bioregunomics approach (Walters 1980; Anderson 1987), many studies have 
questioned the future value of restrictive policies (Barber 1988; Larkin 1996; Ruseski 1998; 
Boude et al. 2001; Polet et al. 2006). Anderson (1985: 409) even states that “the general 
conclusion of this literature is that traditional management techniques such as closed seasons, 
closed areas, gear restrictions, and total quotas are economically inefficient”. The reason why 
restrictive policies are still commonly used lies in their power to preserve a “status quo” in fleet 
performance and dynamics. They serve the unwritten objective of preserving social peace. 
Boude et al. (2001) come to this same conclusion for the whole Common Fisheries Policy.  
 
In Belgium, the key to social peace lies in preserving the (large) beam trawler fleet. For 
decades, this fishing method was highly profitable. However, with the recent and rapid changes 
in the fisheries environment (e.g. stock decline, changing catch per unit of effort and rising fuel 
prices), (restrictive) policies were put into place protecting these fisheries (e.g. more quota for 
larger vessels). Nevertheless, reality has shown that these policies cannot protect the beam 
trawler fleet any longer (e.g.: Stouten et al. (2007) indicates that the current and future rises in 
fuel prices result in beam trawlers going bankrupt even with these protective policies in place). 
Therefore, the time is right to break with the unwritten policy of preserving social peace. Policy 
makers should shift policies and stimulate a conversion towards a more profitable fleet. The 
solution might perhaps lie in a more diverse fleet consisting of different fishing methods and 
different vessel scales. The future value of restrictive policy instruments is to contribute to this 
conversion. However, traditions will need to be overcome and the restrictive policy instruments 
probably will need to be reengineered. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper evaluated the effect of changes in three restrictive policy instruments, respectively, 
maximum fishing days, total quota restrictions and licences on future fleet performance and 
dynamics. The used methodology of system dynamics and sensitivity simulation has proven to 
be very efficient in unveiling these effects. 
 
The results indicated that changes in maximum fishing days and total quota resulted in higher 
fluctuations in fleet performance and dynamics compared to changes in licences. Additionally, 
changes in the first category had a direct impact on fleet performance, though not always as 
expected, whereas licences only affected fleet performance indirectly. 
 
Although the effect of restrictive policy instruments on fishing fleet dynamics was not uniform, 
a constantly returning observation was counterintuitive behaviour partly caused by 
misperception of feedback. Being aware of this phenomenon is perhaps the most important 
recommendation for policy makers resulting from this paper. Also important was that the 
results proved that altering only one type of restrictive policy instruments at a time often fails to 
meet desired outcomes. Therefore, policy makers need to find a balance in combining policy 
instruments. In addition, this paper opened the discussion for rethinking the use of restrictive 
policy instruments in our rapidly changing, complex and uncertain fisheries environment. In 
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Belgium, these policy instruments are currently aimed at “preserving the status quo and social 
peace.” In the future, they should be used as a driving factor in “stimulating fleet dynamics.” 
This opens a lot of further research opportunities. 
 
Our further research will focus on two dimensions. First, research needs to be done to 
determine what kind of conversion is beneficial for the Belgian fleet and how to get there given 
certain policy instruments. Second, how can our simulation model change the thoughts of 
Belgian policy makers to fully back such a conversion? 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Key figures of the Belgian fleet illustrating its evolution between 1950 and 2005. 
 
Number of 
vessels 
Average GT 
per vessel 
Average kW 
per vessel 
1950 457 58 97 
1960 415 70 134 
1970 332 94 223 
1980 208 102 302 
1990 201 127 384 
1995 155 149 426 
2000 131 182 500 
2001 132 185 511 
2002 129 185 519 
2003 125 189 532 
2004 121 188 542 
2005 119 188 545 
Data source: Belgian Sea Fisheries Service
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Table 2: Gross operating profit for an average vessel of the Belgian fishing sub fleet in 2005 (in euro). 
  N Mean Std. 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Eurocutter 15 80 584 59 813 -34 562 186 520 
Large beam trawler 34 83 087 126 134 -144 220 528 738 
Set netter 3 95 524 95 168 11 979 199 119 
Shrimp trawler 8 36 711 46 091 -15 255 112 558 
Other 9 107 525 103 813 -22 712 274 175 
Total 69 80 894 102 693 -144 220 528 738 
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Table 3: The sizes of the arrays in the simulation model. 
Simulation model Reality Justification 
Three restrictive 
policy instruments 
Five main restrictive 
policy instruments  
From the five main restrictive policy instruments at hand in Belgium (maximum 
fishing days, total quota, licences, closed seasons and closed areas), only three policy 
instruments (maximum fishing days, total quota and licences) are the focus of this 
paper. Therefore, only these three are taken into account in the model. The effects of 
other policy instruments are set to zero. 
Four sub fleets Four main sub fleets This study distinguishes four sub fleets in the Belgian fleet based on vessel length, 
fishing method and target species: 1) the fleet of eurocutters, 2) the large beam trawler 
fleet, 3) the set netter fleet and 4) the shrimp trawler fleet. Consequently, our 
simulation model contains four homogeneous sub fleets. 
Six fishing grounds 
(aggregated into three 
fishing grounds) 
Ten main fishing grounds This simulation model aggregates the six fishing grounds (ICES areas) that contain 
most of the Belgian total quota into three fishing grounds: 1) IVbc, 2) VIIde, and 3) 
VIIfg. Therefore, this simulation model underestimates the total amount of Belgian 
quota. 
One theoretical 
average species 
Four important target 
species 
As a result of choosing comprehensibility above comprehensiveness, the simulation 
model runs with one theoretical average species.  
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Table 4: Overview of the scenarios used to test the effect of restrictive policy instruments on fleet performance and 
dynamics. 
 Type of 
sensitivity 
simulation 
Number of 
runs in the 
sensitivity 
simulation 
Variable 
under 
sensitivity 
simulation 
Array of the 
variable 
Type of 
variable 
Strength of 
the 
sensitivity 
simulation 
Initial value 
of the 
variable 
Minimum 
value for 
the 
sensitivity 
simulation 
Maximum 
value for 
the 
sensitivity 
simulation 
Distribution 
function for the 
sensitivity 
simulation 
Scenario 1 Multivariate 1 000 Maximum 
fishing days 
Eurocutter Constant 10% 200 180 200 Random uniform 
    Large beam trawler Constant 10% 250 225 250 Random uniform 
    Set netter Constant 10% 140 126 140 Random uniform 
    Shrimp trawler Constant 10% 200 180 200 Random uniform 
Scenario 2 Multivariate 1 000 Maximum 
fishing days 
Eurocutter Constant 10% 200 200 220 Random uniform 
    Large beam trawler Constant 10% 250 250 275 Random uniform 
    Set netter Constant 10% 140 140 154 Random uniform 
    Shrimp trawler Constant 10% 200 200 220 Random uniform 
Scenario 3 Multivariate 1 000 Total quota IV bc Constant 10% 14 156 674 12 741 007 14 156 674 Random uniform 
    VII de Constant 10% 3 555 241 3 199 717 3 555 241 Random uniform 
    VII fg Constant 10% 2 350 407 2 115 367 2 350 407 Random uniform 
Scenario 4 Multivariate 1 000 Total quota IV bc Constant 10% 14 156 674 14 156 674 15 572 342 Random uniform 
    VII de Constant 10% 3 555 241 3 555 241 3 910 765 Random uniform 
    VII fg Constant 10% 2 350 407 2 350 407 2 585 448 Random uniform 
Scenario 5 Univariate 1 000 Licences (None) Constant 10% 110 99 110 Random uniform 
Scenario 6 Univariate 1 000 Licences (None) Constant 10% 110 110 121 Random uniform 
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Table 5: Input data needed to run the baseline of the simulation model.  
Variable Array Value type 
in the 
model 
Initial value 
in the model 
(mean value 
year 1997) 
Unit of 
measurement 
Real 
or 
proxy 
Data 
source* 
Descriptive statistics 
(1997-2005) 
Maximum 
fishing days 
Eurocutter Constant 200 Day/vessel Proxy ILVO  
 Large beam trawler Constant 250 Day/vessel Proxy ILVO  
 Set netter Constant 140 Day/vessel Proxy ILVO  
 Shrimp trawler Constant 200 Day/vessel Proxy ILVO  
Total quota IV bc Constant 14 156 674 Kg Real SF Mean: 14 156 674 
Maximum: 16 952 000 
Minimum: 11 238 500 
St dev: 1 972 497 
 VII de Constant 3 555 241 Kg Real SF Mean: 3 555 241 
Maximum: 4 219 000 
Minimum: 2 860 000 
St dev: 353 225 
 VII fg Constant 2 350 407 Kg Real SF Mean: 2 350 407 
Maximum: 3 079 500 
Minimum: 1 891 000 
St dev: 423 173,7 
Licences (None) Constant 110 License Proxy ILVO  
Fish price (None) Time series 3,52 Euro/Kg Real SF Mean: 3,67 
Maximum: 4,07 
Minimum: 3,39 
St dev: 0,22 
Fuel price (None) Time series 0,19 Euro/litre Real SF Mean: 0,26 
Maximum: 0,43 
Minimum: 0,16 
St dev: 0,08 
Price for a 
new vessel 
Eurocutter Constant 2 100 000 Euro Proxy ILVO  
 Large beam trawler Constant 5 000 000 Euro Proxy ILVO  
 Set netter Constant 1 000 000 Euro Proxy ILVO  
 Shrimp trawler Constant 2 100 000 Euro Proxy ILVO  
Demolition 
price 
(subsidies) 
Eurocutter Constant 500 000 Euro Proxy ILVO  
 Large beam trawler Constant 1 000 000 Euro Proxy ILVO  
 Set netter Constant 300 000 Euro Proxy ILVO  
 Shrimp trawler Constant 500 000 Euro Proxy ILVO  
Distance to 
fishing 
ground 
IV bc Constant 150 Km Proxy ILVO  
 VII de Constant 350 Km Proxy ILVO  
 VII fg Constant 700 Km Proxy ILVO  
Number of 
vessels 
Eurocutter Variable 42 Vessel Real ILVO Mean: 32,67 
Maximum: 42 
Minimum: 29 
St dev: 4,12 
 Large beam trawler Variable 49 Vessel Real ILVO Mean: 52,78 
Maximum: 56 
Minimum: 49 
St dev: 2,63 
 Set netter Variable 1 Vessel Real ILVO Mean: 2,56 
Maximum: 4 
Minimum: 1 
St dev: 1,01 
 Shrimp trawler Variable 16 Vessel Real ILVO Mean: 14,89 
Maximum: 16 
Minimum: 14 
St dev: 0,78 
Variable 
costs 
Eurocutter Time series 7 181 Euro/week at sea Real SF Mean: 7 982,86 
Maximum: 9 190,94 
Minimum: 7 088,76 
St dev: 744,50 
 Large beam trawler Time series 16 570 Euro/week at sea Real SF Mean: 16 644,01 
Maximum: 17 270,37 
Minimum:15 550,19 
St dev: 596,52 
 Set netter Time series 2 779 Euro/week at sea Real SF Mean: 4 702,71 
Maximum: 8 180,80 
Minimum: 2 778,81 
St dev: 1 565,63 
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 Shrimp trawler Time series 2 027 Euro/week at sea Real SF Mean: 2 903,93 
Maximum: 4 356,79 
Minimum: 1 674,38 
St dev: 944,28 
Fixed costs Eurocutter Time series 1 049 Euro/week Real SF Mean: 1 100,47 
Maximum: 1 221,09 
Minimum: 894,63 
St dev: 102,22 
 Large beam trawler Time series 2 673 Euro/week Real SF Mean: 2 669,17 
Maximum: 2 871,48 
Minimum: 2 528,53 
St dev: 108,34 
 Set netter Time series 299 Euro/week Real SF Mean: 362,09 
Maximum: 536,39 
Minimum: 298,82 
St dev: 95,55 
 Shrimp trawler Time series 427 Euro/week Real SF Mean: 587,83 
Maximum: 859,51 
Minimum: 427,34 
St dev: 129,98 
Debts Eurocutter Constant 62 190 914 
 
Euro Proxy ILVO  
 Large beam trawler Constant 184 830 374 
 
Euro Proxy ILVO  
 Set netter Constant 4 508 181 
 
Euro Proxy ILVO  
 Shrimp trawler Constant 1 371 393 
 
Euro Proxy ILVO  
Productivity 
rate 
Eurocutter 
IV bc 
Time series 5 169 Kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 4 482 
Maximum: 5 221 
Minimum: 3 695 
St dev: 557,95 
 Eurocutter 
VII de 
Time series 3 718 Kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 5 043 
Maximum: 6 105 
Minimum: 3 718 
St dev: 655,43 
 Eurocutter 
VII fg 
Time series 3 168 Kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 3 313 
Maximum: 4 277 
Minimum: 2 688 
St dev: 454,56 
 Large beam trawler 
IV bc 
Time series 12 102 Kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 11 132 
Maximum: 12 820 
Minimum: 9 300 
St dev: 1 061,52 
 Large beam trawler 
VII de 
Time series 9 422 Kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 10 320 
Maximum: 11 223 
Minimum: 9 422 
St dev: 550,25 
 Large beam trawler 
VII fg 
Time series 7 767 Kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 7 171 
Maximum: 8 469 
Minimum: 6 203 
St dev: 744,16 
 Set netter 
IV bc 
Time series 1 959 Kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 1 809 
Maximum: 2 295 
Minimum: 922 
St dev: 437,66 
 Set netter 
VII de 
Time series 1 575 Kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 2 664 
Maximum: 5 087 
Minimum: 1 575 
St dev: 1 043,26 
 Set netter 
VII fg 
Time series 0 Kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 0 
Maximum: 0 
Minimum: 0 
St dev: 0 
 Shrimp trawler 
IV bc 
Time series 1 850 Kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 2 836 
Maximum: 5 263 
Minimum: 1 281 
St dev: 1 352,40 
 Shrimp trawler 
VII de 
Time series 922 Kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 1 194 
Maximum: 2 654 
Minimum: 0 
St dev: 1 023,04 
 Shrimp trawler 
VII fg 
Time series 0 Kg/week at sea Real ILVO Mean: 505 
Maximum: 2 925 
Minimum: 0 
St dev: 1 054,27 
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* Data source: (i) Belgian Sea Fisheries Service = “SF,” (ii) Internal data from the Institute for Agriculture and 
Fisheries Research = “ILVO.”
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FIGURE CAPTIONS 
 
Fig. 1: The evolution of the average gross operating profits for an average Belgian vessel per 
sub fleet between 1997 and 2005 (in euro). 
 
Fig. 2: The evolution of the number of vessels per sub fleet of the Belgian fleet between 1997 and 2005. 
 
Fig. 3: A simplified representation of the system dynamics simulation model not taking into account the arrays 
(where: “□” = stock, “○” = converter, “=>” = in- or outflow, and “bold” = decision algorithms). 
 
Fig. 4: The average gross operating profit per vessel (average GOP/vessel) and the number of vessels in the 
Belgian fleet between 1997-2014 (baseline = simulation data (= black), reference mode = historical data (= grey)). 
 
Fig. 5: Number of vessels per sub fleet between 1997-2014 (= simulated data). 
 
Fig. 6: The effect of sensitivity simulation implying a maximum 10 percent decrease and increase in maximum 
fishing days per sub fleet on the average gross operation profit per vessel and the number of vessels in the Belgian 
fleet between 1997 and 2015 (where: “D” = Decrease, “I” = Increase, and “B” = Baseline). 
 
Fig. 7: The effect of sensitivity simulation implying a maximum 10 percent decrease and increase in maximum 
fishing days per sub fleet on the number of vessels per Belgian sub fleet between 1997 and 2015 (where: “D” = 
Decrease, “I” = Increase, and “.......” = Baseline). 
 
Fig. 8: The effect of sensitivity simulation implying a maximum 10 percent decrease and increase in total quota 
per fishing ground on the average gross operation profit per vessel and the number of vessels in the Belgian fleet 
between 1997 and 2015 (where: “D” = Decrease, “I” = Increase, and “B” = Baseline). 
 
Fig. 9: The effect of sensitivity simulation implying a maximum 10 percent decrease and 
increase in total quota per fishing ground on the number of vessels per Belgian sub fleet 
between 1997 and 2015 (where: “D” = Decrease, “I” = Increase, and “.......” = Baseline). 
 
Fig. 10: The effect of a sensitivity simulation implying a maximum 10 percent decrease in licences on the average 
gross operation profit per vessel and the number of vessels in the Belgian fleet between 1997 and 2015 (where: 
“D” = Decrease, and “B” = Baseline). 
 
Fig. 11: The effect of a sensitivity simulation implying a maximum 10 percent decrease in licences on the number 
of vessels per Belgian sub fleets between 1997 and 2015 (where: “D” = Decrease, and “.......” = Baseline). 
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FIGURES 
 
Fig. 1: The evolution of the average gross operating profits for an average Belgian vessel per sub fleet between 
1997 and 2005 (in euro). 
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Fig. 2: The evolution of the number of vessels per sub fleet of the Belgian fleet between 1997 and 2005. 
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Fig. 3: A simplified representation of the system dynamics simulation model not taking into account the arrays 
(where: “□” = stock, “○” = converter, “=>” = in- or outflow, and “bold” = decision algorithms). 
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 Fig. 4: The average gross operating profit per vessel (average GOP/vessel) and the number of vessels in the 
Belgian fleet between 1997-2014 (baseline = simulation data (= black), reference mode = historical data (= grey)). 
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Fig. 5: Number of vessels per sub fleet between 1997-2014 (= simulated data). 
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Fig. 6: The effect of sensitivity simulation implying a maximum 10 percent decrease and increase in maximum 
fishing days per sub fleet on the average gross operation profit per vessel and the number of vessels in the Belgian 
fleet between 1997 and 2015 (where: “D” = Decrease, “I” = Increase, and “B” = Baseline). 
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Fig. 7: The effect of sensitivity simulation implying a maximum 10 percent decrease and increase in maximum 
fishing days per sub fleet on the number of vessels per Belgian sub fleet between 1997 and 2015 (where: “D” = 
Decrease, “I” = Increase, and “.......” = Baseline). 
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Fig. 8: The effect of sensitivity simulation implying a maximum 10 percent decrease and increase in total quota 
per fishing ground on the average gross operation profit per vessel and the number of vessels in the Belgian fleet 
between 1997 and 2015 (where: “D” = Decrease, “I” = Increase, and “B” = Baseline). 
 
 32
 
Fig. 9: The effect of sensitivity simulation implying a maximum 10 percent decrease and increase in total quota 
per fishing ground on the number of vessels per Belgian sub fleet between 1997 and 2015 (where: “D” = Decrease, 
“I” = Increase, and “.......” = Baseline). 
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 Fig. 10: The effect of a sensitivity simulation implying a maximum 10 percent decrease in licences on the average 
gross operation profit per vessel and the number of vessels in the Belgian fleet between 1997 and 2015 (where: 
“D” = Decrease, and “B” = Baseline). 
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Fig. 11: The effect of a sensitivity simulation implying a maximum 10 percent decrease in licences on the number 
of vessels per Belgian sub fleets between 1997 and 2015 (where: “D” = Decrease, and “.......” = Baseline). 
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